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On Conventions, Institutions, Power,  
and Uncertainty – Some Cursory Remarks 
Jürgen Kädtler ∗ 
Abstract: »Über Konventionen, Institutionen, Macht und Unsicherheit – einige 
kursorische Bemerkungen«. There is no catch all theory in social sciences. The 
strength of convention theory does not consist in establishing the priority of 
conventions in the first place, but in providing more powerful analytical tools 
in view of social interaction and development by bringing both of them into 
play, with their respective influence as being part of the analysis itself for any 
given situation. There is no definite explanation for the very existence of con-
ventions but at best some historical reconstruction of the processes in which 
specific conventions and conventional categories developed. The focus of em-
pirical and historical analysis must be on the interplay between conventions 
being brought into play by actors and the institutional structures and the con-
stellations of power that are influenced by but cannot be reduced on the im-
pact of conventions. 
Keywords: conventions, institutions, uncertainty, bounded rationality. 
 
There is no catch all theory in social sciences. The strength (not only) of a new 
theoretical concept does not consist in being able to offer a better explanation 
for everything. It relies (at least also) on being able to specify where it has its 
strength and where it has not. So for example, the strength of regulationist 
theorising consisted in being able to analyse the macroeconomic and macro-
sociological logic of fordism. It obviously met its limits when requiring to be 
an integrated macro and meso theory, connecting the analysis of macroeco-
nomic logics and its framing by certain types of politics and social institutions 
to a specific type of organisation of work, labour, and production. Where refer-
ring just to the macro-level of analysis might have resulted in a limited and 
manageable plurality of different types of fordism, bringing in the level of 
factory and work organisation finally resulted in having one -ism for any single 
company or even factory: Toyotism, Uddevalism, Kalmarism. In a similar way 
convention theory has nothing to win by engaging in a race of the tortoise and 
the hare with any other theoretical approach, requiring always of having been 
already there. 
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This holds especially for the perspective(s) on conventions and institutions. 
Insisting on a genetic priority of conventions may be plausible in an ontological 
perspective. But it does not lead very far with respect to the empirical analysis 
of historically situated phenomena and developments. If any situation met by 
social actors is already “equipped”, as Robert Salais and Rainer Diaz-Bone 
(2011) rightly put it, the equipment at any given moment consists not only in 
cognitive formats and a repertoire of established conventions and orders of 
justification but also in institutions, social structures, relations of power, that 
have to be interpreted and enacted by competent social actors referring to con-
ventional orientations, but cannot and should not be reduced to this conven-
tional interpretation and enactment, neither in an actual nor in a historical per-
spective.  
With respect to the relation between institutions and conventions the ex-
planatory power of the approach of economics of convention (in short EC) 
emerges in fact on establishing and theorising the conceptional difference be-
tween the two categories, as Salais and Diaz-Bone demonstrate (Diaz-Bone and 
Salais 2011). Where representatives of New Historical Institutionalism (NHI) 
conceive institutions as special subgroups of conventions; namely “those con-
ventions that, far from being mere conveniences, “take on a rule-like status in 
social thought and action” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 9), the EC-approach 
insists on making a clear conceptional distinction. However the strength of 
conventional theory does not consist in establishing the priority of conventions 
in the first place, but in providing more powerful analytical tools for social 
interaction and development by bringing both of them into play, with their 
respective influence as being part of the analysis itself. 
1.  Institutions, Conventions and Uncertainty 
I would not completely agree with the clear-cut distinction, introduced by 
Salais and Diaz-Bone, between institutions as being “created as instruments for 
successful coordination” and conventions as being “the way institutions are 
interpreted and handled in situations” (2011, 18). With respect to institutions 
for me there is too much instrumentalism and “creationalism” in the definition. 
Of course there are also institutions that were created in such an instrumental 
manner, such as the German system of vocational training for example, to 
which I am going to come back later. But by far not every institution has been 
created in this manner. And not every institutionalisation, even if it happened in 
a “creation-mode”, had successful coordination in focus in the first place. Es-
tablishing or confirming positions of power or domination or defending exist-
ing prerogatives are alternative intentions. This does not mean to deny the 
importance of institutions for coordination, whether successful or not. But this 
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coordination function should not be attributed to the creation act but to the 
effectivity of institutions in real life. 
Therefore what I refer to as institutions in general here are complexes of be-
havioral regularities which by permanent adaption, explicit emphasis as well as 
through collective and partly public sanctioning have obtained a highly binding 
character. At this point I am more or less in line with Powell and DiMaggio’s 
concept in referring to a conventional historical background of institutions, 
stressing the character of rules with collective or public sanctions behind them 
as the specific difference. My difference to Powell and DiMaggio at this point 
refers to “mere conventions”. Even if transitions between conventions and 
institutions are somehow fluent, conventions should not be perceived just as 
some weaker and less binding pre-stage of institutions but – in line with Salais 
and Diaz-Bone – as a complementary social resource of its own right, enabling 
individuals (among other things) to deal with institutions in a more or less 
generally understood manner – and by this standing for the effectivity of insti-
tutions in real life. While in other conceptions of institutions – such as those by 
Berger and Luckmann (1971) or the NHI-approach – institutions appear as 
collective behavioral regularities which, once they are established, are merely 
reproduced, in a conventional perspective they come into play as complexes of 
behavioral regularities which are and have to be followed and adapted. 
This re-accentuation is important insofar as there is no following rules or 
adaption of them, which is not at the same time an interpretation of a given rule 
with regard to the particular concrete situation. The application of the rule 
without regard to the situation is neither seen as an expression of social deci-
sion-making skills nor as a proof of a successful integration, rather the oppo-
site. As everybody knows: A prescription undoubtedly defines a procedural 
rule, may be even a legally binding one, and institutionally it is subject to sanc-
tions. And yet following prescriptions literally in the sense of “work-to-rules” 
is one of the most common ways to lead rules ad absurdum. 
As Olivier Favereau states: “A rule is never a ready solution – it is always a 
heuristic” (1994, 132, translation by JK), i.e. a scheme of interpretation. People 
use it to structure reality and make it accessible in order to make it cognitively 
manageable. At the same time it is being reinterpreted and has to stand the test 
of reality. But this means that the actors need to be sure that other participants, 
when dealing with a rule, use their scope for interpretation in a sufficiently 
conforming/consenting way. However, outside these mutual relations there is 
no fixed point to which one could adhere. Conventions are rules solely secured 
by mutual attribution of behavior and therefore they are in danger to evaporate 
in the infinite loops of double contingency: expectations, expectations of ex-
pectations etc., leading to a game of mirrors. Conventions enable bounded (not 
just limited!) rationality under the conditions of fundamental uncertainty, to 
take up Simons’s and Knight’s categories (Simon 1949, 1982; Knight 1921).  
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The founding father of this concept of conventions was not worried at the 
time. In 1740 the English historian and philosopher David Hume introduced it 
in his “Treatise on Human Nature”. He used the example of two rowers in one 
boat in order to characterize a specific form of coordinated action which looks 
on the surface as if it was based on a silent agreement although such an agree-
ment does not really exist. What is at stake here, is not the “Whether” but the 
“How” of the co-ordination. For Hume as a decent empiricist the clarification 
that this sort of thing existed was in itself sufficient. 
The attempt to explain the occurrence of conventions in accordance with the 
principles of individual rationality was undertaken by David Lewis in his 
groundbreaking work on “Convention” (Lewis 1969). He was not really con-
cerned with sociological or economic questions but rather with the solution of 
the paradox that language is of a conventional nature whereas nobody can 
explain how these conventions could come into being without a language al-
ready available. However, in order to illustrate the problem he used a number 
of nice little problems of interaction taken from everyday life. That is also why 
his work was not without consequence especially for social sciences and eco-
nomics. 
Lewis solved the problem by declaring the conditions of a convention, as 
summarized here briefly, to be general knowledge within the group concerned. 
(All prefer to follow a certain rule out of many possible rules. They also expect 
the others to act the same way and therefore follow it. They would also follow 
a different rule, if the others did.) Against Lewis’ argument it may be rightly 
objected that his solution arises from the noble art of dragging oneself out of 
the swamp by one’s own hair. Because how can individuals solely by way of 
interaction and reciprocal reflection find out that something represents general 
knowledge – mind you, we are talking about knowledge not convictions.  
Obviously situations are potentially ambiguous. And for rules to work and 
conventions to become effective it has to be clarified in what sort of situation 
one finds oneself. Only this specification of the context of activity creates the 
preconditions for conventional actions, i.e. sufficient clarity as to which con-
ventions one can relate to when explaining and legitimizing one’s own actions 
in a given situation. Orders of justification comprise the double meaning of 
(rational) explanation and (normative) legitimization, where the difference 
between norm-guided and interest-led actions can be consistently analysed as a 
reference to competing orders of justification in one and the same situation. 
The clarification of the situation, the understanding to which order of justifi-
cation one is referring to here and now can only be achieved via a common 
attribution of meaning and it is therefore of a conventional nature itself. Thus, 
we are dealing with two levels of conventions: Rules of conduct within unam-
biguously identified orders of justification (= worlds, contexts of interpreta-
tions) and attributions of meaning by which these orders of justification can be 
identified. Once they are identified, the rational actions of individuals can be 
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analysed as conventional actions within and as competent navigating between 
different orders of justification. When asked which orders of justification exist 
and why, one is – at least to a great deal – thrown back on Hume’s empiricism. 
Accordingly, Lewis with his analysis of conventions has decisively advanced 
the sociological theory of action, but regarding his actual problem, the solution 
of the paradox of a conventional explanation of language without language, he 
has failed. The very existence of common knowledge can only be observed and 
analysed, but it cannot be explained. As Wittgenstein puts it: “Philosophy must 
not interfere in any way with the actual use of language, so it can in the end 
only describe it. For it cannot justify it either. It leaves anything as it is” (Witt-
genstein 2009, 55 [§ 124]). There is no explanation of the very existence of 
conventions without referring to situations where conventions already existed. 
In other words: In analysing bounded rationality we stay in the hermeneutical 
mode. 
What we may be able to explain however is the development of specific 
conventions or conventional categories against the background of existing 
ones, in a similar way as etymology can explain changes and the emergence of 
new words in an existing language. Our capacity to do so depends on our abil-
ity to trace back conventions to the historically situated constellations and 
collective interactions in or by which they were put forth. In this perspective 
conventions themselves are “traces” of former development and by this of 
configurations of conventions, institutions, relations of power and historical 
contingency. This necessarily historical reconstruction of specific conventions 
is demonstrated by Boltanski’s analysis of the emergence of “les cadres” and 
Salais et al.’s analysis of the contruction of “chômage” [unemployment] as 
social categories (Boltanski 1982; Salais, Baverez and Reynaud 1986). 
2.  Institutions Informing Conventions 
Making the difference between and/or connecting logical or systematic and 
historical explanation has been one of the most fundamental problems in de-
bates on Marx’ theory. And debates on this question did often result in scholas-
ticism and exegetics, at best loosely connected to empirical realities. Neverthe-
less this question is important when we address the problem of the respective 
priority of conventions and/or institutions. In a logical or systemic perspective 
it makes sense to see institutions as being based on conventions. In a historical 
perspective things are much more inconclusive because historical situated 
people always meet a reality that already is equipped by cognitive formats, 
conventions, institutions etc. 
I want to illustrate this briefly by an important aspect in German labour reg-
ulation. Wage schemes in the German system of collective bargaining and 
contracting in the post war period are predominantly based on a system of 
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“summary” job evaluation (“summarische Arbeitsbewertung”). Wage catego-
ries of collective agreements for an industry or are cluster of industries are 
defined by rather complex, multidimensional descriptions of generic job re-
quirements, and pay scale grouping in any single case is by taking reference to 
these summary description. Obviously this procedure of applying the generally 
descriptions on single cases is highly conventional, based on a common under-
standing among managers, workers and workers representatives etc. Of course 
there have always been disputes on individual cases, but they did not affect the 
performance of the classification in general. These systems are rather intrans-
parent in an analytical perspective and have been criticised for this by Europe-
an jurisdiction. Nevertheless they are sufficiently unambiguous for those prac-
tically involved on a conventional basis. However, not everything is just 
conventional in this conventional basis. For in all these summary pay scale 
descriptions there is a common structuring principle: the difference between 
“ungelernt” (unskilled), “angelernt” (semi-skilled) and “Facharbeiter” (skilled 
worker/craftsman), with additional categories being inserted between these 
basic levels. And the “Facharbeiter” is not (only) a job profile but (in the first 
place) an institution, coupling a certain level of professional competences to 
certain, publicly regulated type of apprenticeship. And in more or less all col-
lective agreements the “Facharbeiter”-level is the level of reference for all other 
categories in the pay scheme. It is important to see that this categorisation is by 
conventions: As pay scale classification refers to the requirements of jobs and 
not to individual qualifications of persons, it is on what the actors involved 
expect that a “Facharbeiter” is or should be able to do and not on individually 
certified professional qualification. However this whole system of completely 
conventional pay scale classifications would simply not exist without the insti-
tutionalisation of the German system of vocational training by law in 1897 with 
the “Facharbeiter” being its cornerstone (Thelen 2004, 39-91). In this case 
previous institutionalisation is the precondition for the development of conven-
tions. 
3.  Financialisation – Conventions, Institutions and Power 
Finally I will quite briefly come back to my own analysis of “Financialisation 
of Capitalist Economies” (Kädtler 2011). The principal argument is that finan-
cialisation should not be analysed as financial actors coming into power as the 
result of increased financial dependency of other economic actors. Instead it is 
argued that financialisation is the outcome of a paradigmatic shift in economic 
rationalities, with financial economics becoming predominant compared to 
other conventional economic rationalities, which nevertheless stay relevant too. 
This new balance in economic rationalities gives more power to such actors 
that are able to refer successfully to financial rationality and to establish them-
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selves as authorities for the interpretation of ambiguities. So on the one hand 
financialisation is the result of a new type of conventional economic rationality 
coming up. This is based on a new object brought into play as point of refer-
ence for conventional justification by economists: the new system of financial 
mathematics with the Black-Scholes-Formula, the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) etc. as its cornerstones (MacKenzie 2006). On the other hand finan-
cialisation is the outcome of historically situated opportunity structure where a 
lot of different actors were engaged: Stock exchange authorities, providing 
historical data for the analysis; the institutional structure of US business 
schools; specifics of the US pension fund system and the position of case law 
in US pension funds regulation; the growing importance of financial officers as 
important members of dominant coalitions in companies after the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system etc. This opportunity structure provided a sufficient-
ly broad range of interested actors and situations, where the new type of ration-
ality could be offered or perceived as a solution for respective problems. So 
when the EC-approach gives us a strong tool for analysing financialisation, it is 
by focussing on the interplay between conventions being brought into play by 
actors and the institutional structures and constellations of power that are influ-
enced by but cannot be reduced on the impact of conventions.  
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